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Limits to Russian Soft Power in the 
Post-Soviet Area
by Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz
The influence of  soft power is very difficult to measure. It is associated with 
intangible resources such as culture or ideology, as well as the ability to use them 
skillfully in order to gain allies through attraction rather than coercion or payments. 
After the collapse of  communism, Russia retained a huge military potential from 
the Soviet Union but largely lost its cultural and ideological appeal. Therefore, in 
order to rebuild its external attractiveness (at least in the post-Soviet space), Russia 
began to develop its foreign policy according to soft power principles. But Russian 
policy-makers misinterpreted the concept of  soft power. They failed to appreciate 
the idea of  partnerships with clear advantages for both sides in the near and long 
term. Instead, Moscow perceives soft power as the capacity to influence, or even 
manipulate, public opinion in target countries.
Although Russia possesses influential soft power channels to post-Soviet states like 
access to its labor market, language proximity, a common culture, and enormous 
energy resources, Moscow has been unable to enhance its attractiveness among 
its closest neighbors. Russian authorities focus most of  all on loyal constituencies 
(such as compatriots living abroad) and seek to mobilize people who already fol-
low Russia’s goals and principles. Russia’s insufficient soft power activism in the 
post-Soviet area is also due to its neo-imperial attitude toward neighboring states. 
Moscow is not able to offer them an attractive vision of  integration without build-
ing patterns of  strong dependence. Therefore, its proposal of  close political and 
economic cooperation seems quite dangerous for the sovereignty and long-term 
development of  its neighbors.
The notion of  soft power holds strong normative potential based on domestic 
standards and norms of  social and political life that are practiced in the state seek-
ing to enhance its influence abroad. It is impossible to create an appealing external 
image without dealing effectively with domestic problems. Russia has many prob-
lems with corruption, the abuse of  human rights, the lack of  democracy, and the 
rule of  law. Thus its model of  political and socio-economic transformation cannot 
be seen as a positive example for other post-Soviet countries.
As soft powers usually use the most transparent and democratic measures to build 
their external attractiveness, the only way for Russia to become a real soft power in 
the post-Soviet area is to introduce serious internal reforms that focus on the liber-
alization of  its economy and the democratization of  its political system. It is only 
through real democratic change that Russia will reach its soft power potential.
Summary
DGAPanalyse 8 | July 2012
2
Begrenzungen für russische »soft 
power« im postsowjetischen Gebiet
von Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz
Der Einfluss von »soft power« ist äußerst schwer zu messen. Er steht in engem 
Zusammenhang mit immateriellen Ressourcen wie Kultur oder Ideologie, wie 
auch mit der Fähigkeit, diese geschickt einzusetzen, um Verbündete eher durch 
Anziehungskraft statt durch Zwang oder Bezahlung zu gewinnen. Nach dem 
Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus behielt Russland ein riesiges Militärpoten-
zial aus dem Erbe der Sowjetunion, verlor aber so gut wie jegliche kulturelle und 
ideologische Anziehungskraft. Daher begann Russland in dem Bestreben, seine 
Anziehungskraft im Ausland (zumindest im postsowjetischen Raum) wiederherzu-
stellen, seine Außenpolitik gemäß Prinzipien der »soft power« zu entwickeln. Doch 
dabei unterlagen die russischen Politiker einer Fehlinterpretation dieses Konzepts. 
Sie wussten die Idee einer Partnerschaft mit klaren Vorteilen für beide Seiten nicht 
wertzuschätzen. Stattdessen nimmt Moskau »soft power« nur wahr als das Poten-
zial zur Beeinflussung, ja zu Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung in Zielländern.
Auch wenn Russland wichtige Kanäle für »soft power« gegenüber postsowjetischen 
Staaten besitzt wie etwa der Zugang zu seinem Arbeitsmarkt, sprachliche Nähe, 
eine gemeinsame Kultur und riesige Energieressourcen, sah es sich außerstande, 
seine Anziehungskraft für die direkten Nachbarn zu erhöhen. Die russischen 
Machthaber konzentrieren sich vor allem auf  eine loyale Anhängerschaft (wie etwa 
Landsleute, die im Ausland leben) und bemühen sich darum, Menschen zu mobili-
sieren, die Russlands Ziele und Prinzipien bereits teilen. Russlands unzureichende 
»soft power«-Aktivitäten in der postsowjetischen Region sind ebenfalls bestimmt 
durch seine neoimperiale Einstellung gegenüber den Nachbarländern. Moskau ist 
unfähig, ihnen eine attraktive Aussicht auf  Integration zu bieten, ohne zugleich 
wieder Muster einer starken Abhängigkeit einzuführen. Deshalb erscheint sein Vor-
schlag einer engen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Zusammenarbeit recht gefähr-
lich für die Souveränität und langfristige Entwicklung seiner Nachbarn.
Der Begriff  der »soft power« enthält ein starkes normatives Potenzial, das auf  
innenpolitischen Standards sowie Normen des sozialen und politischen Lebens 
beruht, die in dem Staat praktiziert werden, der seinen außenpolitischen Einfluss 
vergrößern will. Es ist unmöglich, ein attraktives Image im Ausland zu schaffen, 
ohne sich wirksam mit innenpolitischen Problemen auseinanderzusetzen. In Russ-
land bestehen große Probleme mit Korruption, der Missachtung von Menschen-
rechten, mit einer mangelhaften Demokratie und einem schwachen Rechtsstaat. 
Deshalb kann sein Modell der politischen und der sozioökonomischen Transfor-
mation kein positives Vorbild für andere postsowjetische Staaten sein.
Da »soft powers« üblicherweise die transparentesten und demokratischsten Maß-
nahmen einsetzen, um ihre nach außen wirkende Anziehungskraft aufzubauen, 
besteht die einzige Möglichkeit für Russland, zu einer wirklichen »soft power« im 
postsowjetischen Gebiet zu werden, im Beginn ernsthafter innerer Reformen, die 
sich auf  die Liberalisierung seiner Wirtschaft und die Demokratisierung seines 
politischen Systems konzentrieren. Nur durch wirkliche demokratische Verände-
rung wird Russland sein volles Potenzial an »soft power« erreichen.
Zusammenfassung
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Russia’s Soft Power Potential
The effectiveness of  soft power instruments used 
by states is extremely difficult to evaluate because 
it is associated with intangible resources such as 
culture or ideology, as well as their skillful usage in 
the pursuit of  allies. According to Joseph S. Nye, 
the political scientist who introduced the concept 
of  “soft power,” soft power states are those which 
are defined by their “ability to get what they want 
through attraction rather than coercion or pay-
ments” and which can be cultivated through rela-
tions with allies, economic assistance, and cultural 
exchanges.1 In that sense, the concept of  soft power 
is not limited to the capacity to influence, or even 
to manipulate public opinion in a target country. It 
also includes a well-developed idea of  a partnership 
with mutual benefits in the near and long term.2 
In other words, soft power convinces—but does 
not force—others to want what it wants because 
of  clear advantages for both sides, and soft powers 
tend to use the most transparent and democratic 
measures to build their credibility in this regard.
After the demise of  the Soviet Union, Russia 
inherited a huge military potential but largely lost 
its cultural and ideological appeal. At the time, its 
external image seemed to be even more important 
than during the Cold War. In order to rebuild its 
attractiveness (at least in the post-Soviet space), 
Russia began to develop its foreign policy accord-
ing to soft power principles. Although many 
experts assumed that Russia’s ability to apply soft 
power techniques toward post-Soviet countries 
was minimal, some saw its soft power potential as 
quite significant.3 They agree that Russia’s source 
of  attractiveness in the post-Soviet space is related 
to at least four elements: a huge labor market, lan-
guage proximity, a common culture, and enormous 
energy resources.
Most of  the post-Soviet states have a visa-free 
regime with Russia, which makes its large labor 
market quite accessible to post-Soviet citizens. 
Officially, there are about three million workers 
from CIS countries in Russia, but there are four 
times as many people who work there illegally.4 
Among the European Union’s six Eastern partners, 
most foreign workers in Russia come from Arme-
nia (2.5 million), Ukraine and Azerbaijan (2 million), 
Georgia (1 million), Belarus (up to 700,000), and 
Moldova (more than 300,000). Russia is the most 
attractive work destination for these citizens, but 
in the case of  Ukraine and Moldova, almost the 
same number of  people prefer working in the EU 
because of  geographic and cultural proximity.
In addition to the visa-free regime, widespread 
knowledge of  the Russian language is another 
important reason for emigration to Russia. 
Although the Russian minority does not exceed 20 
percent in the six Eastern Partnership countries, 
a majority of  the populations of  these countries 
know Russian, most notably in Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Moldova.5 Russian is still a common language 
in business, social, cultural, and scientific rela-
tions, despite the fact that the Soviet Union met its 
demise over 20 years ago. Although the number of  
schools that use Russian as the language of  instruc-
tion has decreased, a majority of  people living in 
post-Soviet states consider Russian as an important 
language in the education of  younger generations.6
Other sources of  Russia’s attractiveness toward 
post-Soviet states are cultural, religious, and histori-
cal links. The Russian Orthodox Church plays a 
very significant role in this regard, and its jurisdic-
tion is recognized by most believers in Belarus and 
Moldova, as well as by a significant number of  
Ukrainians. Russian popular culture, including con-
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temporary music, books, films, and TV programs, 
are also widely popular in post-Soviet states. The 
most influential products of  Russian soft power 
tend to use the rhetoric of  fraternity in reference 
to the common victory in World War II and nostal-
gia for the lost Soviet empire.
The last soft power channel that Russia uses 
toward its post-Soviet neighbors is its huge energy 
potential.7 Russia ranks first and eighth in the 
world in proven reserves of  natural gas and crude 
oil. Although it is the number one energy exporter 
in the world, its leading position as an oil and gas 
supplier is possible mainly because of  the Soviet-
era development its energy industry. Russia’s energy 
sector is very inefficient and now needs enormous 
investments to maintain a high level of  crude oil 
and natural gas production.8 The geographical 
proximity of  Russian resources can act as a source 
of  economic attraction for all post-Soviet countries, 
especially for those whose economies are largely 
depend on cheap energy resources. It is also worth 
noting that a lack of  transparency in business deals 
with Russian energy companies often allow elites 
in neighboring countries to obtain huge private 
benefits.9
Increasing Russia’s Soft Power 
after the “Color Revolutions”
The most significant period for applying soft power 
as part of  Russian foreign policy was during the 
“color revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine 
(2004). These events occurred almost at the same 
time that the EU expanded to the east, when eight 
states from Central and Eastern Europe, includ-
ing the three former Soviet republics of  Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia, became new EU member 
states. Both processes were perceived by Russia’s 
policy makers as a threat to its interests in the 
post-Soviet neighborhood as well as a failure of  
Russian foreign policy.10 Russian politicians realized 
that the West’s predominance over Russia in the 
post-Soviet area is due to better access to public 
opinion through well developed soft power chan-
nels such as international NGOs and media outlets. 
The Kremlin perceived these instruments as tools 
of  Western propaganda that should be counterbal-
anced by Russia’s response.
Russian soft power activity in reaction to grow-
ing Western influence in the post-Soviet space 
focused on formulating an ideological response. 
Russian authorities have begun to promote their 
own vision of  democracy, criticizing Western lib-
eral democratic countries for ideological imperial-
ism in promoting democratic values around the 
world.11 In 2004, Sergei Ivanov, who is now chief  
of  staff  of  the Presidential administration and is 
a former Minister of  Defence, admitted that “if  
there is a Western democracy, Eastern democracy 
should also exist.”12 Later, Deputy Prime Minister 
Vladislav Surkov created the concept of  “sovereign 
democracy,” which justified weaker societal control 
over political authorities than in Western liberal 
democracies.13
Russian authorities also tried to formulate a 
positive message for citizens of  the former Soviet 
Union, without referring to the activities of  West-
ern countries. This approach was based on the 
conviction that Russian society—as well as other 
post-Soviet societies—needs a mobilizing idea.14 
They decided that the best way to bring together 
the nations of  the former Soviet Union was to 
refer to their joint victory over Nazi Germany in 
World War II. They thus supported a number of  
film productions and organized elaborate celebra-
tions for the anniversary of  victory in WWII. At 
the same time, Moscow was particularly sensitive 
to any attempt to discredit the achievements of  the 
Soviet Army, which in fact liberated Central and 
Eastern European countries from the Nazis, but 
also forced them into communism and took their 
sovereignty.15
Following the color revolutions, Russia has 
attempted to exert more influence over post-
Soviet states through soft power tools such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
Russian Orthodox Church, and media dissemina-
tion. In 2007, Russian authorities established the 
Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian World), which 
is financed by both the government and private 
companies. The name of  this organization refers 
to the ideological concept of  the Russian nation 
that goes beyond geographical and ethnic boundar-
ies and focuses on cultural and linguistic links. It 
means that the “Russian world” consists of  people 
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who think and speak in Russian, not just those who 
identify as Russians.
The official aim of  the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
is to popularize Russian language and culture as 
a crucial element of  world civilization, and to 
develop cross-culture dialogues and understanding 
between people.16 The organization’s activities are 
quite controversial because it focuses mainly on 
strengthening the position of  the Russian diaspora 
living in post-Soviet states. Russkiy Mir’s activities 
extend far beyond the promotion of  language and 
culture: it concentrates on the fight against the “fal-
sification of  history,” the protection of  the rights 
of  Russian minorities, as well as pushing Russia’s 
agenda in neighboring countries. The foundation 
has a very nationalist image.17
In addition to pro-Kremlin (quasi) non-governmen-
tal organizations, the Russian Orthodox Church 
has also become an important ally in supporting 
state policies toward compatriots living abroad. 
Russian Orthodox leaders have often supported the 
Russian World ideology. The new Moscow Patri-
arch, Kirill I, declared that “the core of  the Russian 
World today is Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus, and… 
regardless of  state divisions… we are spiritually 
one people.”18 For Kirill, who is interested in the 
unification of  Orthodox believers living in post-
Soviet countries, there should be a unique Russian 
civilization that opposes Western civilization and 
its assertion of  the universality of  the Western 
tradition. The Moscow Patriarchat has also intensi-
fied the establishment of  Orthodox associations 
in post-Soviet states, especially in Ukraine, with a 
clearly pro-Russian political agenda.19
The third instrument used widely by Russian 
authorities to increase their soft power influence 
in post-Soviet states and in other countries in the 
aftermath of  the color revolutions was mass media, 
especially television and the Internet. Russian 
state-controlled TV news programs were broadcast 
across most of  the CIS territory and increased their 
influence on public opinion. Moreover, in 2005 
the Kremlin founded the TV news channel Russia 
Today (RT), which broadcasts in English, Span-
ish, and Arabic in over 100 countries. Web-based 
private news agencies such as Regnum and Novy 
Region were also very effective in strengthening 
Kremlin-sanctioned views on the domestic situa-
tion in the post-Soviet states. For many journalists 
from Ukraine, Belarus, and other post-Soviet coun-
tries, these outlets were a main source for global 
and local information.20 Thus in 2004 Russian 
authorities also decided to modernize the state-
owned news agency RIA Novosti. They established 
the website Inosmi.ru to provide Russian-language 
versions of  foreign publications. At the time, popu-
lar Russian newspapers, among them Komsomolskaya 
Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty, enlarged their special 
editions in neighboring countries, and Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta launched a special program with dozens of  
global newspapers such as the Washington Post, Daily 
Telegraph, and Le Figaro, to edit their monthly sup-
plement on Russia’s political situation for foreign 
audiences.
In response to the color revolutions, Russia’s ruling 
elites boosted their political power in the country 
and limited Western influence in the post-Soviet 
space. Their soft power activities in this regard 
were mostly seen as propaganda against Western 
efforts to promote democracy and human rights, 
and not as a reliable offer of  cooperation with 
target countries. Due to the huge influence of  Rus-
sian media in the post-Soviet area, a large segment 
of  Ukrainian society supported Russia’s position in 
its 2008 war with Georgia (although the Ukrainian 
government pursued a different policy at the time). 
However, Ukraine did not completely change its 
orientation toward economic and political integra-
tion with Western institutions.21
Russia’s Soft Power Politics after 
the Russo-Georgian War
Russia’s military intervention in Georgia damaged 
the country’s reputation in the post-Soviet area. 
Leaders of  CIS countries began to fear for their 
states’ territorial integrity, so none of  them recog-
nized the independence of  Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, against Russia expectations. To improve 
political and social relations with neighboring coun-
tries, the Kremlin tried to use the positive image of  
the Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet area to its 
advantage.22 Patriarch Kirill helped Russia partially 
rebuild its image in Georgia. The Moscow Patri-
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archate has recognized the canonical jurisdiction 
of  the Georgian Church over separatist regions of  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Church 
has also played the important role of  arbiter and 
offered, in practical terms, financial support for the 
Abkhazian and Ossetian parishes.
Following the Russo-Georgian War, Russian 
authorities decided to strengthen soft power 
channels toward compatriots and establish stron-
ger links between Moscow and the vast Russian 
dispora. In September 2008, President Dmitry 
Medvedev reformed the federal agency for com-
patriots (Rossotrudnichestvo), and in May 2011 he 
created the Compatriot Legal Support and Protec-
tion Fund. Moreover, Russian authorities began to 
define compatriots not only as Russian Federation 
citizens living abroad, but also former citizens of  
the USSR, Russian immigrants from the USSR or 
the Russian Federation, descendants of  compatri-
ots, and foreign citizens who admire Russia’s cul-
ture and language.23 Moscow also required that “the 
compatriot identity be certified by a respective civil 
society organization or by the person’s activities to 
promote and preserve the Russian language and 
culture.”24
Russian authorities also decided to more extensively 
promote Russian youth movements among com-
patriots living in neighboring countries. In sum-
mer 2010 they held an international forum at Lake 
Selinger to give a warm welcome to young leaders 
from post-Soviet states. In addition, the ultra-
nationalist youth organization Nashi (Ours), which 
was created by pro-Kremlin social activist Vasily 
Yakemenko, enlarged its activities beyond Russian 
borders. For example, in Estonia they established 
the youth organization Molodoye Slovo (Word of  
the Youth) which has supported youth exchange 
programs, sporting events, summer camps, and 
public demonstrations.25
The Kremlin’s activities aimed at the Russian 
minority are seen negatively by neighboring gov-
ernments and societies. They interpret Russia’s 
policy toward the diaspora as a tool of  its foreign 
policy that threatens the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of  their countries.26 This assumption is 
confirmed by declarations by Russian officials who 
admit that the “Russian diaspora abroad provides 
social and humanitarian support for the implemen-
tation of  the interests of  the Russian Federation in 
post-Soviet countries.”27
The Russo-Georgian War also tightened Russian 
policy toward its closest neighbors. The Kremlin 
decided to enlarge its influence in the CIS area by 
mobilizing loyal constituencies living there despite 
the negative consequences that would result from 
such a policy. After the war in Georgia, Russia’s 
attitude toward its compatriots living abroad also 
became more nationalist, which has raised concerns 
in neighboring states. Although Russian politicians 
claim that this policy has been based on soft power 
principles,28 it certainly contradicts Joseph Nye’s 
concept of  soft power because it hampers real 
partnerships with target countries.
Russia’s Influence in the Global 
Financial and Economic Crisis
Although Russia was deeply hit by the global 
financial crisis of  2008–2009, other post-Soviet 
countries faced more serious socio-economic 
problems. Due to its large financial reserves, Mos-
cow was able to implement a series of  anti-crisis 
measures that stabilized the labor market as well 
as the finances of  many state-run companies. This 
relatively positive economic situation prompted the 
Russian elite to use the crisis to enlarge the coun-
try’s political and economic influence in CIS states 
by acquiring assets in their most important compa-
nies. This belief  was formulated in Russia’s unof-
ficial foreign policy doctrine that was published in 
the Russian edition of  Newsweek in May 2010.29 By 
acquiring major shares in several energy enterprises, 
Russia strengthened its monopoly on energy mar-
kets in the region. Although Russian authorities 
underlined the mutual benefits that resulted from 
such transactions, for neighboring governments it 
was obvious that establishing joint ventures with 
Russian companies in the energy sector usually 
leads to dependency.
The EU’s efforts to establish a free trade area with 
its Eastern neighbors led the Kremlin to strengthen 
the development of  alternative projects for eco-
nomic integration in the post-Soviet area. The 
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Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan is 
the most serious Russian economic project in years. 
Russia has offered membership in this organization 
to other post-Soviet states, above all to Ukraine, 
in order to complicate their accession to the free 
trade area with the EU. When comparing the EU 
and Russian projects for economic integration, it is 
clear that the EU’s offer is more attractive for post-
Soviet states, mainly because of  the positive impact 
it would have on the modernization of  their econo-
mies. On the other hand, due to its many require-
ments, the EU offer is more difficult to achieve, 
which makes the Russian project much more acces-
sible. Russia uses its energy resources rather than 
soft power to enhance its economic domination 
in the post-Soviet area. Offering preferential gas 
prices in exchange for political concessions cannot 
be viewed as increasing Russian soft power in the 
region. It is payment, not economic assistance, and 
apart from short-term benefits it does not further 
the economic development of  Russia’s partners and 
it undermines their political independence. In April 
2010, Russia reached an agreement with Ukraine 
for discounted deliveries of  Russian natural gas. But 
in exchange, Ukraine had to extend the lease of  the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for 25 years after 
2017. Russia then proposed special gas prices for 
Belarus in exchange for the sale of  stakes in Belaru-
sian strategic enterprises to Russian companies.30
Russia has tried to engage more in global develop-
ment aid. In 2009 and 2010, Russia spent 785 mil-
lion dollar and 472 million dollar respectively on 
aid, compared to an annual contribution from 2004 
to 2008 of  about 200 million dollar.31 The major-
ity of  these funds went to post-Soviet countries. 
Contrary to other global powers, Russia does not 
involve the non-governmental sector and its aid 
very often is associated with the direct implemen-
tation of  Russian political objectives in recipient 
countries. Such actions are against the basic princi-
ples of  development assistance and do not improve 
soft power influence.
Russia’s socio-economic model limits its capac-
ity to act as a soft power in the post-Soviet area.32 
Although Russia has the highest GDP per capita 
among CIS member states, there are many sys-
temic problems that cannot be resolved. According 
Transparency International, Russia is more corrupt 
than the six Eastern Partnership states.33 It also has 
major problems with the rule of  law and media 
freedom, ranking 163 and 140 in the world respec-
tively.34 The stability and effectiveness of  Russia’s 
government is also low compared to other post-
Soviet countries: according to the World Bank, Rus-
sia’s ranking of  119 makes it more poorly governed 
than Georgia (83) and Armenia (93).35 All of  these 
factors undermine the attractiveness of  the Rus-
sian political leadership among post-Soviet societ-
ies, namely Vladimir Putin, who was more popular 
than many domestic politicians in some post-Soviet 
states before 2008. According to recent surveys 
from 2011 that compared the political leadership 
in Russia and the United States, Barack Obama 
was viewed more favorably than Vladimir Putin in 
Georgia (47% approval for Obama versus 3% for 
Putin) and in Azerbaijan (58% to 54%).36
Conclusions
Russia holds influential soft power channels for 
post-Soviet states such as an accessible labor mar-
ket, language proximity, a common culture, and 
enormous energy resources. But the country has 
not been able to enhance its attractiveness as a soft 
power among its closest neighbors. Although Rus-
sian policy-makers recognize the importance of  
soft power, they have misinterpreted the concept. 
They reduce it to a platform for spreading propa-
ganda and focus most of  all on loyal constituencies 
like compatriots living in post-Soviet states. Rus-
sian policy in this regard seems to contradict the 
concept of  soft power: instead of  winning people 
over who do not share Russia’s foreign principles 
and goals, the country seeks to mobilize those who 
already agree with them.
Russian elites do not appreciate the idea of  a true 
partnership with mutual benefits in the near and 
long term. Russia’s failed soft power activism in the 
post-Soviet area is also a result of  its neo-imperial-
ist attitude toward neighboring states. Moscow has 
been unable to offer them an attractive vision of  
cooperation without building patterns of  strong 
dependence. Thus its proposal of  closer economic 
integration appears to threaten their sovereignty 
and long-term development.
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The notion of  soft power contains strong norma-
tive potential based on domestic standards and 
norms of  social and political life practiced in the 
state intending to enhance its influence abroad. It 
is impossible to create an appealing external image 
without dealing effectively with domestic problems. 
Russia has enormous problems with corruption, 
abuse of  human rights, the lack of  democracy, and 
the rule of  law. Therefore, its model of  political 
and socio-economic transformation cannot be seen 
as a positive example for other post-Soviet coun-
tries. In order to strengthen its soft power influ-
ence, Russia should first of  all pursue serious inter-
nal reforms that focus on the liberalization of  its 
economy and the modernization of  its government 
as well as a democratization of  its political system. 
The EU could be a strategic partner for Russia in 
this regard by offering further assistance during its 
political and socio-economic modernization.
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